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Abstract 
This report focuses on the energy efficiency of electricity distribution networks mainly from the perspective of 
network losses. As proposed in Article 15 of the revised Energy Efficiency Directive, the European Commission 
after consulting relevant stakeholders, should prepare a common methodology in order to encourage network 
operators to reduce losses, implement a cost-efficient and energy efficient infrastructure investment programme 
and properly account for the energy efficiency and flexibility of the grid. This two-part report focuses on the 
status of regulatory policies in the EU-28 and recommendations that can be followed by the Member States in 
order to improve their grid efficiency. 
This first part of the report focuses on the electricity grids, with the interaction between regulation and network 
losses being conceptually analysed with the presently available regulation schemes and a survey on some 
research proposal being presented. After a brief introduction on the main standing-points of the EU framework, a 
comparative analysis of the regulation in EU member states is outlined. The ”players’ perspective” in terms of the 
opinion of crucial EU stakeholders and leading experts in EU are assessed thought a set of interviews of which 
the outcomes are presented. Finally, some recommendations for Member States and conclusions are drawn. 
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1 INTRODUCTION: THE EU ENERGY EFFICIENCY DIRECTIVE AND THE ROLE OF DSOs 
AND SUPPLIERS 
 
The Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) [1], introduced in 2012 and amended in 2018 is the key EU policy for reaching the 
2020 and 2030 energy saving targets. 
In this framework, Article 7 is one of the pillars. This article: 
 Asks EU Member States (MS) to introduce the so-called “Energy Efficiency Obligation Schemes” (EEOSs). 
According to the EEOS, energy distributors (DSO) and/or retail energy sales companies are required to save 
1.5% of the annual energy sales during the period 2014-2020, through the implementation of ad hoc 
measures (“Each Member State shall set up an energy efficiency obligation scheme. That scheme shall 
ensure that energy distributors and/or retail energy sales companies that are designated as obligated 
parties under paragraph 4 operating in each Member State’s territory achieve a cumulative end-use energy 
savings target … That target shall be at least equivalent to achieving new savings each year from 1 January 
2014 to 31 December 2020 of 1.5% of the annual energy sales to final customers of all energy distributors 
or all retail energy sales companies by volume …”). Not necessary strictly related to the electricity network. 
 Allows EU MS, as alternative option with respect to the EEOS, to set and introduce other policies, not only 
directed toward DSO and retailers, provided that these policies lead to equivalent energy savings. Among the 
alternative policies, Article 7 mentions: energy or CO2 taxes that have the effect of reducing end-use energy 
consumption; financing schemes, incentives, regulations or voluntary agreements, training and education 
leading to the application of energy-efficient technology and able to reduce end-use energy consumption; 
standards aiming at improving the energy efficiency of products and services (including buildings and vehicles), 
except where these are already mandatory; energy labelling schemes, with the exception of those that are 
mandatory 
 Also allows a combination of EEOS and alternative policy measures 
Consequently, under Article 7 obligations for DSOs in order to enhance energy efficiency can be set by the single 
Member States. Currently, 14 Member States either partially or fully generated their savings through the 
implementation of the EEOSs (like the so-called Italian “white certificates” and the French “Energy Saving Certificates”), 
namely Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Poland, Slovenia and 
the United Kingdom. 
According to the JRC report [2] that yearly analyses the annual reports submitted by the EU MS and related to the 
obtained progresses with respect to the national energy efficiency targets [3], to the energy consumption trends and to 
the implementation of Articles 5 and 7 of the EED, in 2016 savings obtained by EEOSs represent about 41% of the total 
savings related to Article 7 of EED. 
Under Article 7 of the EED, all the EU MS, with the exception of Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and Poland, 
implemented alternative measures with respect to EEOS. 
Another key article of the EED, namely Article 15, focused on the energy efficiency of the transmission and distribution 
networks, and it states that the “[EU] Member States shall ensure that network operators are incentivised to improve 
efficiency in infrastructure design and operation” and that the “[EU] Member States shall ensure that national energy 
regulatory authorities pay due regard to energy efficiency in carrying out the regulatory tasks specified in Directives 
2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC regarding their decisions on the operation of the gas and electricity infrastructure”. Strictly 
related to electricity network. 
Moreover, “Member States shall ensure that an assessment is undertaken of the energy efficiency potentials of their 
gas and electricity infrastructure, in particular regarding transmission, distribution, load management and 
interoperability, and connection to energy generating installations … Concrete measures and investments are identified 
for the introduction of cost-effective energy efficiency improvements in the network infrastructure …” and “Member 
States shall ensure that network operators are incentivised to improve efficiency in infrastructure design and operation” 
Focusing on electricity network (similar principles can be applied also to the gas network), according to the requirements 
of this article, a reduction in the level of both transmission and distribution network losses is a key requirement for 
reaching this energy efficiency goal. 
The current report specifically focuses on electricity network losses, with reference to the need for preparing, by 31 
December 2020, a common methodology aiming at encouraging “network operators to reduce losses, implement a cost-
efficient and energy efficient infrastructure investment programme and properly account for the energy efficiency and 
flexibility of the grid”, according to what stated by the 2018 amendment to Article 15 (2a). 
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2 THE ROLE OF REGULATION IN ENCOURAGING NETWORK LOSSES REDUCTION 
 
According with the Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) [4], [5], referring to the regulatory treatment of losses 
on electricity networks, the procurement of losses (which is the procedure implemented in each country in order to 
manage the way through which covering power losses), could be under the responsibility of: 
 Network operators, who are obligated to purchase the electricity to cover losses in the network they operate. 
Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) and used in the tariff 
calculation. In this case, losses are treated like any other induced or occurred imbalance. This option is used in 
the majority of EU Countries, like Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and 
Sweden 
 Suppliers, who buy additional energy which will be injected for compensating the losses caused by consumption 
of their clients. Losses are priced at the same level as the wholesale market price to supply the consumption 
and are treated like any other induced or occurred imbalance. The difference between estimated losses and 
effective losses on the network is priced at the cost of providing the balancing energy on the balancing market. 
This option is used in Belgium (partially, on the transmission grid), UK, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
 A mixture of the two systems is used in Greece, where generators and importers are responsible for covering 
transmission losses while suppliers cover distribution losses 
Currently, in several European countries, the costs for losses are payed by consumers, giving system operators no 
incentive to reduce network losses. Proper measures should be introduced to incentivise system operators to reduce 
losses in their grids or at least maintain them at low levels. Moreover, different regulatory approaches could be 
implemented for technical and non-technical losses to facilitate the most efficient regulatory schemes 
In general, losses are one of the key contributors to operational expenditures in power networks. The CEER 
recommended that system operators aim to find the right balance between the costs of investing in more efficient 
technologies and savings in the cost for losses 
In this framework, the goal of possible incentives to be applied is to enable National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) to 
ensure that TSOs and DSOs implement economically efficient operational and investment decisions aimed at 
limiting/reducing the level and the associated costs of the energy necessary to cover network losses 
The analysis of current regulatory practices related to the losses in transmission or distribution networks shows that, 
presently, incentives in almost all Member States apply only to DSOs and that 3 main mechanisms can be identified: 
 Incentive-based regulatory models, where the cost of losses is part of the general revenue cap (losses are 
treated like any other cost component) 
 Allowed rate of losses to include in tariffs capped to a maximum percentage value 
 Mechanisms allowing the network operator to be rewarded (or penalised) if network losses are lower (or higher) 
than a predetermined reference value 
A general scheme showing how regulation can affect the reduction of the network losses is represented in Figure 1 
below: 
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Figure 1 - Impact of regulation on the reduction of network losses.  
 
Source: JRC, 2020 
 
TARGET
Mandatory 
Regulations
Incentives for 
Investments
Project 1 Project 2 Project 3 Project N…
Intervention 1
Network Losses
Intervention 2 Intervention M…
Distribution  
Network Tariffs
Penalties/Rewards Thresholds
Potential interventions: 
• Reconductoring
• Superconductors
• Shield wire segmentation
• HVDC Technologies
• Distributed energy Resources
• Reactive power compensation
• Gas-insulated substations
• Constructing new MV/LV 
substations
• Tap Changing Under Load  
Transformers (TCULT)
• High efficiency transformer
• Voltage level increment
• Power flow controllers
• Conservative Voltage Reduction
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3 RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 
 
Ortega et.al. in [6] discussed the main approaches used for recovering distribution network costs and highlighted the 
weaknesses of each method. Then they proposed a new tariff design based on the cost causation principle. According to 
[4], distribution tariff designs are separated in two parts:  
1) determination of total allowed revenue by distribution companies, and  
2) allocation of this revenue requirement among network users.  
Accordingly, the focus of [6] is on the second part, i.e. to allocate the distribution utility revenues requirements among all 
customers in an optimal manner. The proposed tariff allocation mechanism is based on game theory, considering the 
customers’ utility function to remain constant. Assuming demand to be inelastic, the optimum network to be designed is 
the one leading to minimum cost, and each customer should pay the costs that he/she causes to the system, depending 
on its geographical location and peak demand and energy in each time-of-use block. Under this approach, each 
customer is expected to minimize his/her costs which contributes in the costs caused to the system, so behaves such as 
to minimize system costs.      
The integration of Distribute generators (DGs) into the networks pose challenges for distribution system operators 
(DSOs) and their regulations. In terms of DSO’s expenditures, the integration of DGs reduces OPEX while its impact of 
CAPEX is not obvious. For example, if it leads to deferred investment costs if the grid, it reduces CAPEX.  Ruester et. al. 
[7] opens the topic of rethinking the regulation of European electricity DSOs by shedding light on the missing aspects in 
the current regulations and providing insight on how regulation should be changed to incentivize DSOs to facilitate 
market entry of welfare-enhancing technologies in a timely manner and to manage DG-penetrated distribution systems, 
more efficiently. It concludes that the remuneration schemes for DSOs should be reconsidered to cope with the 
increasing network integration of DGs.    
Increasing the number of electricity consumers becoming prosumers, and high penetration of distributed generators call 
for the revision regulatory mechanisms for network cost compensation and tariff structures. An analysis performed by 
Küfeoğlu in [8] on the impact of integrating electric vehicles (EVs) and Photovoltaics (PVs) on the distribution network 
under the current network tariffs for households in Great Britain indicates that increasing PV penetration increases the 
distribution tariffs for all customers, regardless of whether they have PV or not. While increasing penetration of EVs 
reduces the network tariffs for all customers.  
Generally, distributed generators can lead to increase or decrease of the distribution network costs, and the tariff design 
acts as the main tool for allocating the costs to customers who own and operate these resource. However, currently DG 
owners do not pay network tariffs or are subject to the traditional pricing models for normal consumers, known as load-
base pricing [9]. Picciariello, et. al. in [9] applies a pricing mechanism based on cost causality and the combination of net 
metering and pure volumetric tariffs, on the contest of increasing DG penetration and investigate the impact of this 
pricing scheme on the magnitude of cross-subsidies from consumers to prosumers. The degree of subsidy depends on 
the penetration of DGs, as well as the network characteristics, such that the rate of cross-subsidy is higher in low-
density grids. 
The integration of DGs into the distribution networks leads to additional costs for network operators related to 
connecting these technologies to the grid. From one side, the regulator should provide regulatory schemes which 
encourage utilities to invest on their networks, allowing for higher penetration of DGs, and from the other side, the 
potential interventions taken by DSOs should be recovered through a cost-reflective tariff mechanism. Cambini in [10] 
proposes a new multi-part tariff structure for prosumers, which is able to cover these additional costs under net 
metering approach, while minimizing the current deficiencies of net metering approach. The proposed tariff mechanism 
in [10] includes a fixed component reflecting the grid-connection costs and a variable component reflecting the 
operating costs of distribution networks.  
Recently, distribution grid tariffs in many countries are being reformed to cope with the new characteristics of the 
networks, especially in terms of DG integration. While in Europe there has been legislative proposals to harmonize these 
reforms across the borders, many European countries have argued against this proposal and stated that distribution 
tariffs are local affairs. Govaerts, et. al. in [11] developed a long-run market equilibrium model which can capture the 
impact of wholesale market on the distribution grid tariffs. The focus of the study performed in [11] is on the spillover 
impacts of distribution grid tariffs in neighbouring interconnected countries through integrated wholesale electricity 
markets. The results indicate that unharmonized tariffs cause significant storage investment spillovers. 
Vales, et. al. in [12] studies the regulatory barriers for integrating demand response programs into the distributed 
electricity networks from a European perspective. The remuneration mechanism of DSOs should be revised to incentivize 
the use of demand response programs when it is cost effective. According to [12], DSO regulations should be revised to 
incentivize operators to integrate demand response as a flexibility resource in their grid operation and planning. To this 
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aim, the authors propose that there must be clear incentives for efficiency and innovation in long-term, without 
endangering regulatory stability. The remuneration is proposed to be based on output based regulation, incentivizing 
efficient OPEX and CAPEX, while accelerating depreciation and covering longer regulatory periods.  From the network 
tariff perspective, they recommend to implement cost reflective tariff structure with capacity charge and dynamic tariff 
components, separation of non-network related component of the tariff, and flexibility to adapt tariffs to local 
conditions. Another study performed by Annala, et. al. in [13] indicate that demand response programs can reduce the 
environmental impacts of electricity utilization, however, there are still regulatory barriers, mainly on the customers’ 
engagement in the programs. The analysis was performed based on a survey of Finnish electricity retailers and 
distribution system operators (DSOs). The participant suggested that the regulatory authorities should create incentives 
for DSOs to introduce power-based distribution tariffs for demand response providers.  
An analysis preformed on the reflectivity and predictability of different distribution network tariffs for residential 
customers in [14] has indicated that peak load tariffs are the most reflective mechanisms in light of the energy 
transition, while energy use based tariffs can be most accurately predicted. According to the analysis in [14], the energy 
use has very close correlation with the distribution network losses, as losses are function of the energy transferred. 
Whereas, the peak loading of network which indicates the investments needed in the network, are less clearly linked to 
the energy consumption of households. 
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4 CURRENT REGULATORY ACTIONS IN EU 
 
A synoptic view of the current regulatory actions implemented in the EU Member States and related to the network 
losses and their procurement by DSOs is reported in Table 1 
 
Table 1 –Current regulatory policy actions in the EU-28. Source: JRC, 2020 
Country Policy Action 
Austria 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs. There is a dedicated tariff for network losses  
There is a maximum threshold for distribution network losses. The maximum loss level in this 
model should be assessed and reduced continuously. The maximum loss threshold approach 
lacks the differentiation between technical and non-technical losses  
Belgium 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  There is a dedicated tariff for network losses   
A revenue cap mechanism is used for TOTEX (total expenditure) of the DSOs which includes cost 
of losses  
Bulgaria 
DSOs are incentivized to perform loss reductions as it is part of their costs. However, if other 
cost-reduction opportunities are provided to the DSO, loss reduction may be not a first driver  
DSOs are obliged to respect a given loss threshold, such that exceeding this threshold leads 
them to audit or non-recognition of the costs. This mechanism provides no incentive to save 
more energy by reducing losses to lower than the threshold  
Croatia 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
Cyprus 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
The responsibility of setting distribution tariffs is shared by the DSO, NRA, and government. The 
DSO calculated the allowed revenue, and the NRA approves the revenue allowance proposal of 
DSO  
Czech Republic 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs. The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
DSOs are obliged to respect a given loss threshold, such that exceeding this threshold leads 
them to audit or non-recognition of the costs. This mechanism provides no incentive to save 
more energy by reducing losses to lower than the threshold  
Denmark 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
Only about half (53%) of investments related to smart grid costs going forward are included in 
the regulated cost base. The other costs include the costs for system stability (installation of 
synchronous condenser and static var compensator), software, and meters 
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Country Policy Action 
The regulatory has set revenue cap for DSOs that includes incentives to reduce power losses  
Estonia 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
Finland 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
France 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
An incentive is applied on DSOs on the volume of losses and also the price of procuring energy 
to cover losses  
DSOs are obliged to respect a given loss threshold, such that exceeding this threshold leads 
them to audit or non-recognition of the costs. This mechanism provides no incentive to save 
more energy by reducing losses to lower than the threshold  
Germany 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
The costs of losses are included in the revenue cap and is benchmarked regularly  
Distributed generators do not pay grid tariffs and the DSO tariffs are only charged to loads. 
Furthermore, according to the German law, newly constructed storages are incentivized by not 
paying network tariffs for 20 years 
German DSOs use 2-component network tariffs including a power based price and a power band 
price. Network costs are allocated to network users based on cost causation principle, taking into 
account the contribution of each user to the annual simultaneous peak load 
An efficiency bonus, based on a benchmarking process, may be issued to eligible DSOs. DSOs 
are eligible for this bonus only if they are determined to be fully efficient in the benchmarking 
process. This bonus is designed to enhance DSOs' innovation not only to be fully efficient, but 
also to try to exceed 100% relative efficiency, to achieve super-efficiency status  
DSOs are obliged to respect a given loss threshold, such that exceeding this threshold leads 
them to audit or non-recognition of the costs. This mechanism, by itself, provides no incentive to 
save more energy by reducing losses to lower than the threshold  
Greece 
The distributed energy sources do not pay for distribution grid tariffs but pay for the 
maintenance done by the TSO of the part of the grid which is solely used by them.  
Generators and importers are responsible for covering transmission losses while suppliers cover 
distribution losses  
Hungary 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  There is a dedicated tariff for network losses  
Ireland 
Network losses are paid by the suppliers and not by the system operators, such that each 
supplier buys the energy needed to compensate losses caused by the consumption of its clients. 
Estimated losses are priced with wholesale market price to supply consumption  
Italy 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
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Country Policy Action 
In order to encourage more efficient technologies in transmission and distribution networks, the 
domestic electricity tariff has been proposed to be reformed. Based on the new tariffs, the tariff 
for energy transmission, meter management, and system charges, which accounts for nearly 
40% of the customer's bill, would be identical for each consumption level. Therefore, the 
previous progressive structure of tariff based on incremental energy usage, have been abolished 
and domestic customers are paying about the actual cost of the services they receive. In the 
new tariff design, the standing charges in the total bill is increased for some customers (to 
around 25% of the total bill for domestic customers and 40% for non-domestic customers on 
average).  The new tariff is expected to unlock the installation potential of energy-efficient 
electrical devices, e.g. heat pumps and electric vehicles, which have been hampered by the 
progressive tariff structures  
The government sets the annual national energy saving targets and the total obligation in terms 
of number of certificates for the obliged parties. The obliged and voluntary parties have to deal 
with final users to pursue energy savings  
Latvia 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  There is a dedicated tariff for network losses  
Lithuania 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  There is a dedicated tariff for network losses  
Luxembourg n.a. 
Malta 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
Netherlands 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
DSOs are incentivized to perform loss reductions as it is part of their costs. However, if other 
cost-reduction opportunities are provided to the DSO, loss reduction may be not a first driver  
There is a yardstick regulation in place with a target set ex-ante to a regulatory period based on 
historical results on the average performance of DSOs  
The grid costs of the DSOs in Netherlands mostly depend on grid capacity and not usage. This 
makes the use of capacity based tariffs fair in the Netherlands. Also capacity based tariffs 
significantly reduce the administrative costs for DSOs, compared to volume-based tariffs. As a 
result for customers, this tariff design is more beneficial for consumers with relatively high 
consumption compared to their capacity. Therefore, it reduces the incentive for energy 
efficiency, as grid tariffs do not depend on the usage 
Poland 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs. The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
Losses on distribution network are set by a benchmarking approach  
Distributed generators do not pay grid tariffs. This is a benefit for DG owners while it may be 
disadvantage for other users especially when the costs that the DGs evoke to the network 
exceeds their benefits  
Portugal 
Network losses are paid by the suppliers and not system operators, such that each supplier buys 
the energy needed to compensate losses caused by the consumption of its clients. Estimated 
losses are prices with wholesale market price to supply consumption  
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Country Policy Action 
Distributed energy sources do not pay grid tariffs, although smarter grids are needed to 
integrate more DGs and thus DGs should also be eligible to contribute in supporting the 
distribution system services 
The DSOs have specific incentives in forms of bonuses or penalties which is related to the DSO's 
performance and directly targets loss reduction. The incentive mechanism allows DSOs to be 
rewarded/penalized in case of achieving global distribution losses below/above the threshold set 
by the National Regulatory Authority, on a yearly basis  
In Portugal, time of use (ToU) tariffs have been implemented for a long time by a significant 
percentage of consumers, representing 80% of total demand.residential consumers can choose 
among tariffs with one up to three time periods.  ToU tariffs provide incentives for consumers to 
do load shifting 
In Portugal, the regulatory framework for implementing dynamic ToU tariffs for grid access has 
been created by the regulators with the aim of enhancing the active participation of users [20]. 
Dynamic tariffs enable consumers to participate in mechanisms that minimize the grid costs, 
provide alternative mechanisms for grid operators to minimize cost and postpone new 
investments, and enhances operational security by minimizing the impact of production variation 
from renewables 
Romania 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  There is a dedicated tariff for network losses  
Slovakia 
The DSOs have specific incentives in forms of bonuses or penalties, which is related to the 
DSO's performance and directly targets loss reduction  
Slovenia 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  The costs of losses are included in network tariffs 
The costs of losses are included in the revenue cap and is benchmarked regularly  
Spain 
Network losses are paid by the suppliers and not system operators, such that each supplier buys 
the energy needed to compensate losses caused by the consumption of its clients. Estimated 
losses are priced with wholesale market price to supply consumption  
Loss reduction of DSOs is addressed through a benchmarking approach among all the Spanish 
DSOs on their performance  
Sweden 
System operators are responsible to procure the power for covering losses of the network they 
operate. Average costs of losses are approved by the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) and 
used in the calculation of tariffs.  The costs of losses are included in network tariffs  
The DSOs have specific incentives in forms of bonuses or penalties which is related to the DSO's 
performance and directly targets loss reduction  
In Sweden, distribution tariffs are not set by national regulators, but are set by the DSOs, under 
certain legal requirements 
The energy efficiency directive has been implemented in Sweden such that the tariff must 
incentivize efficient use of the grid and efficient energy production and usage. The Swedish 
national regulator supervises the tariffs' structure to ensure these requirements  
The tariffs vary greatly among the DSOs in Sweden, with highest tariffs for small DSOs with 
rural distribution 
There is the regulatory framework of income-cap under which each DSO decides which tariffs to 
apply, in terms of proportion of fixed and variable costs, time of use tariffs, capacity based 
tariffs, … 
Customers receive 2 bills, one from the DSO and one form the retailer 
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Country Policy Action 
DSOs are responsible to keep their total revenue within the limit during the regulatory period 
(4years). Under this approach, the tariffs are likely to stay stable for a longer period without 
transferring their management from DSOs to regulators 
Domestic customers' tariffs are usually composed by a fixed (based on the size of user) and a 
volume fee (per kWh), while larger customers' tariffs include fixed fee, a capacity fee based on 
subscribed capacity, and a volume fee. However, with the increasing integration of smart 
meters, it is possible to implement dynamic or hybrid time of use tariffs and capacity based 
tariffs also for small residential customers 
United Kingdom 
Network losses are paid by the suppliers and not system operators, such that each supplier buys 
the energy needed to compensate losses caused by the consumption of its clients. Estimated 
losses are priced with wholesale market price to supply consumption  
Distributed energy sources pay network tariffs under 2 methodologies:  22 kV or above Extra-
High-Voltage Distribution Charging Methodology (EDCM), and Below 22 kV Common Distribution 
Charging Methodology (CDCM). Under EDCM methodology, a specific tariff is produced for each 
customer. Under CDCM, different tariff categories in each DSO area are set and each customer 
belong to a tariff category 
The DSOs have specific incentives, in forms of bonuses or penalties, which is related to the 
DSO's performance and directly targets loss reduction  
In UK, the distribution network tariffs are based on long-run quasi-incremental cost approach, 
based on the annualized cost of a scaled hypothetical network model which characteristics 
match the one of the actual network. This methodology is used for all consumers connected to 
below 22 kV network. These tariffs do not involve any locational signal, but are mainly reflecting 
the characteristic of the network and consumers in each DSO. The CDCM approach applied on 
below 22 kV consumers assumes that only consumptions at system peak period impose costs 
on the DSO and the cost per unit of demand in peak time is determined through a distribution 
reinforcement model. The cost is calculated based on the estimated costs for DSOs to install, 
maintain, and operate the assets needed to serve a hypothetical network to supply 500 MW of 
demand. Then, the total cost is allocated to different customer classes (totally 27 user groups) 
based on their voltage level and profile class 
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Table 2: Synoptic view of regulatory (tariffs + incentives) across EU. Source: JRC, 2020 
 
  
DSO Supplier
Dedicated tariff 
for losses 
Cost of losses 
included in 
network tariff
No tariffs for 
losses
Recovered by 
other charges
Maximum losses 
threshold 
Cost of losses / 
incentives as 
part of the 
revenue cap
Incentives on 
volume of 
losses
Incentives on 
prices
Efficiency 
bonus for DSOs
Yardstick 
competition 
mechanism
Austria X X X
Belgium X X X
Bulgaria X X X
Croatia X X
Cyprus X X
Czech Republic X X X
Denmark X X X
Estonia X X
Finland X X
France X X X X X
Germany X X X X X
Greece X X
Hungary X X
Ireland X X
Italy X X
Latvia X X
Lithuania X X
Luxembourg
Malta X X
Netherlands X X X
Poland X X
Portugal X X X X
Romania X X
Slovakia X X X
Slovenia X X X
Spain X X
Sweden X X X X
United Kingdom X X X
Procurement Tariffs
Country
Main Incentives
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5 PLAYERS’ PERSPECTIVES 
This section gives an overview of the stakeholders’ consultation done on the subject regarding the potential 
measures to be implemented towards the efficiency increase of the electricity grids.  
The players contributions were gathered by interviewing the stakeholders’ representatives via a structured 
questionnaire and then transcript into the following texts: 
5.1 Knud Pedersen, Chair of Eurelectric Distribution & Market Facilitation 
Committee 
 
 Which are the most promising actions you have in mind for the increase in the efficiency of 
electricity networks? Which is the role played by transmission and distribution respectively? 
The future investments needed for the electricity network (especially in a perspective of a wide electrification) 
will be more related to distribution part than to the transmission one. It has to be highlighted that, talking 
about investment in distribution grid, the national differences among EU countries may be significantly 
relevant. However, in general, the investment cost is the largest part of the total cost (accounting for about 
two third), and there are huge potential for enhancing the CAPEX efficiency in the distribution grid, by 
improving planning and increasing the capacity utilization being more interactive with customers flexibility. 
Considering the technical interventions for increasing the energy efficiency of the network, reducing losses, 
relevant aspect are the introduction of remotely read meters and the digitalization of the system (with more 
sensors and the possibility of obtaining a higher amount of data), allowing to have a more precise picture of 
the grid, and – in particular – to better quantify losses, thus being able to effectively act in order to reduce 
them and obtaining a better management of the grid itself. Nevertheless, it has to be underlined that, from 
the economic point of view, losses have a lower impact on the total cost of the network with respect to the 
investment cost, which remains the key component on which acting for enhancing the economic efficiency. 
Losses account for about 4% of the total amount of electricity delivered, while from the economic perspective 
they could weight for about 15% of the overall cost for operating the distribution system. 
 The current regulatory framework is sufficient to ensure the achievement of energy efficiency goals 
for the transmission and distribution electricity networks, as expected in accordance with the 
European Energy Efficiency Directive? 
The ways in which the regulatory framework is implemented in the individual EU Member States vary 
significantly: the specific regulations may incentivize efficiency improvements in different manners, and in 
some cases there may not be significant incentives for effectively enhancing energy efficiency. 
Furthermore, there is not link between the general energy efficiency instruments at EU level and the economic 
regulatory framework for infrastructure companies: in the modernization of the regulatory framework, some 
kinds of incentives for companies in order to pursue energy efficiency should be set, but – in different cases – 
this did not happened. 
 According to your opinion, the procurement of energy losses should be under the responsibility of 
network operators (as it currently happens in the majority of EU Member States) or of suppliers? 
The only natural way is that DSOs purchase the amount of energy needed to cover the losses. Of course, in 
many countries DSOs who have the obligation to cover the losses have to buy the amount of electricity 
needed in the competitive market, so is the supplier that deliver the electricity to them. However, it has to be 
underlined that in both cases of technical and non-technical losses is up to the DSOs (who have the proper 
instruments) to find the right way to limit them, as it will be difficult for other subjects to act in a proper way. 
 In general, it could be more effective to set mandatory regulations or to define incentives for 
investments, in order to support network operators in reducing network losses? 
First of all, standardization for specific technology equipment should be relevant in order to introduce some 
kind of mandatory elements on the system and intrinsically increase its efficiency. However, the best option 
for progressing in enhancing energy efficiency is to set incentives to people and to companies for 
implementing efficiency improvements. 
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 The analysis of current regulatory practices related to the losses in transmission or distribution 
networks shows that, currently, incentives in almost all Member States apply only to DSOs and that 3 
main mechanisms can be identified: 
Incentive-based regulatory models, where the cost of losses is part of the general revenue cap (losses are 
treated like any other cost component) 
Allowed rate of losses to include in tariffs capped to a maximum percentage value 
Mechanisms allowing the network operator to be rewarded (or penalised) if network losses are lower (or 
higher) than a predetermined reference value 
According to your opinion, which is the best one and why? 
The first method is preferable and recommendable. It is important to start from the current situation and put 
incentives inside the revenue cap (with a regulation that gradually increase the ambitions), in order to 
incentivize DSOs to make transparent the progresses on energy efficiency enhancement and on lowering 
losses.  
 According to your opinion, which could be the tariffs design that leads to the most positive impact on 
the reduction of network losses? 
 
The losses need to be reflected into the variable part of the tariffs, as they are related to the amount of 
electricity transported and distributed. 
 The current regulation related to electricity and gas could allow an effective cross-vector integration 
among them, in a future perspective, in order to enhance the energy system flexibility? If no, which 
changes could be required? 
There are many possibilities. The starting point is to take into consideration the infrastructures that are 
already available in the country (for instance, in Denmark there are both modern and efficient gas and 
electricity grids). 
Of course, a major part of decarbonisation process is related to the electrification coupled with the power 
generation from renewables. However, gas could play a significant role in this process. For example, referring 
to heating sector in Denmark, in areas where there are a lot of natural gas individual boilers for heating 
purpose, it is possible to quite easily reduce the demand for fossil gas by introducing heat pump. However, 
another relevant option is to combine heat pumps with gas boilers, because during very cold days heat pumps 
are not very efficient and in areas where there is not a lot of wind electricity price might be high (while the 
gas price could remain stable). Consequently, it could be possible to lower the total amount of fossil fuels 
with a smart interplay and a system partly based on gas and partly on electricity. 
Moreover, looking at power-to-hydrogen option it could be possible use (at least partially) the already existing 
gas infrastructure or it could be possible to progressively to introduce more “green” gas (like biogas) in the 
grid. These are options for exploiting in the best way the existing infrastructures also in this framework of 
energy transition. 
In general, there are several specific opportunities, with technologies already available, and there could be 
economic and financial benefits for households, society and companies. 
 From a technical point of view, which could be the best actions to be implemented for maximising 
the increase in electricity network efficiency keeping a balance between investments and economic 
savings deriving from losses reduction? 
There would not enough economic bases for substitution of older transformers with new ones before they end 
of lifetime. The improvements from the economic point of view are so little that they cannot justify this. 
Most of efficiency improvement that they have detected are related to the way in which they operate they 
assets. 
Of course, when investments in new transformers and lines are needed, it is necessary to ensure that there is 
a standardization of these technologies, in order to have the best efficiency already potentially integrated in 
the technology itself. 
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 Which good practices and recommendations the European Union should introduce in order to build a 
common framework for all the Member States? 
It should be based on a structure combining the standardization of the specific technologies, a guideline for 
the economic regulation of the revenues flow and finally a guideline related to how to optimize (from a 
financial point of view) reinvestments related to the perspective of efficiency improvements (how they can be 
monetized and quantified in the right way). 
 
 
5.2 Roberto Zangrandi, Secretary General of EDSO (European Distribution 
System Operators) 
 
 Which are the most promising actions you have in mind for the increase in the efficiency of 
electricity networks? Which is the role played by transmission and distribution respectively? 
First of all, the question in divided into two parts: increase in efficiency in distribution and increase in 
efficiency in transmission. 
Referring to distribution, it is needed an enhancement of the concept of sandboxes, both from the regulatory 
and design perspective. In this sense, ACER plays a major role, and it should stay on the side of distributors, 
encouraging and following the efforts in deploying new technologies in smart grids and the smart use of the 
grid. It is not easy, but an acceleration in demonstration and the testing of cutting edge technologies in the 
management of the grid is needed. 
Incorporating RES at local level is a priority, but it is necessary to introduce, beside this, all the possible 
experimentations and proposals related to the increase of local resilience and of resilience techniques. When 
considering that the DSOs are the main enablers for active consumers, for the use of platforms, for active 
asset management at local level, the role of the resilience techniques (that must be at the basis of every 
experimentation) cannot be forgotten. 
Enhance sandboxes means also not to anticipate regulation for future technologies but adapting the existing 
and upcoming regulation to what technology is about to offer. An example is represented by the proliferation 
of the charging units for electro mobility. In the main European countries there is the possibility to have 
individual houses equipped with a charging unit for electro mobility. When preparing an individual house by 
delivering a charging facility for personal use, the possibility to share this charging facility by authorizing 
citizens to provide a charging service outside their houses should be foreseen. Currently, there are not 
regulations allowing citizens to share their charging points: this aspect should be discussed with ACER and 
CEER, because private citizens could play a significant role not in managing the grid, of course, but in enabling 
the grid – with the support of DSOs – to render a public and widespread reliable service. 
Regarding TSOs, they seem to play so far their game in order to acquire a kind of shared sovereignty on the 
use of consumption data coming from the consumers. The issue of the ownership of data and the possibility 
to share the use of data is a vexed question between DSOs and TSOs. Many regulatory drivers in Europe show 
that as far as the data management is concerned, the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) are inclined to 
allow the TSOs an advantage in the use of data. On the other side, the TSOs consider the ownership of data 
for technological purposes and not for commercial purposes their exclusive pertinence. 
The concept of data evolves and the evolution of this concept is something that is not often considered by the 
analysts that are active in shaping the regulation. The nature itself of data changes with the evolution of 
technologies: it can be possible to divide private data, commercial data and technological (measurement of 
consumption, loads, average voltage, etc.; operative data that can be useful in the interchange between TSOs 
and DSOs) or operational data. 
This is the main item for an effective cooperation. DSOs must reopen the folder of data discussion with TSOs 
and retailers. In synthesis, the relation between TSOs and DSOs is deeply influenced by how data are 
managed, considered and shared. 
The evolution of data is the main worry. In fact, there are data that will be provided beyond the meter (and 
that are more sophisticated and accurate in term of granularity than those provided by smart meters) by the 
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connection of intelligent appliances to the domestic network: it is the Internet of Things (IoT), which is going to 
major play a role in the individual households. 
The market will generate a set of alternative data deriver by the connected appliances that are out of any 
possible regulation and that are in a condition to change structurally the market use of those data. 
Referring to the technological impact on efficiency, there is, in the framework of the Clean Energy Package 
delivered by the EU Parliament, a lot of discussion on the notion of storage. 
DSOs have always seen storage as essential tool for the management of the load and the balancing of locally 
generated imbalances in frequency. This is going to play a strong role in the future due to the relevance of 
RES, but it is going to be strongly regulated by the NRAs and opens spaces for the market. No commercial 
storage should be owned or operated by the DSOs. DSOs have to fight a lot to convince the legislative process 
to accept a moratorium on this, in order to grant the DSOs themselves the use of storage until market shows 
up. 
Second, this is only one example: we do not want to see the same regulation interference as far as the cutting 
edge technologies (rewiring, superconductors, high technology transformers, etc.) are going to be deployed. 
The parts that are essential to shape the grid of the future have also such a big market impact and a big role 
in designing the investments that DSOs are going to undertake in the next years that must be strongly 
considered. 
The Clean Energy Package foresees the necessity of 260 billion € per year of investments. The DSOs as a 
whole are around 25 billion (10%) per year of this investment. If it can be considered that the acceleration of 
the technologies can be supported and that there will be money enough to be invested in the hyper-
modernization, there could be the possibility to test and embrace cutting edge technologies and to make 
strong investments in order to have hyper-performant grids in the future. It is important, however, to have, 
from one side, an evolutionary path for supporting the modernization of the grid but, from the other side, this 
should be done without destroying the investments already made in the grid. The challenge, speaking about 
the hyper-performant elements of the grid of the future, is not to generate a high amount of stranded costs, 
which will be on the shoulders of DSOs and probably of the consumers. 
A possible risk is instead a widespread not coordinated use of cutting edge technologies, which could lead to 
have in Europe the coexistence of a hyper-performant grid on one side and a very poor grid on the other side. 
It is necessary to avoid a huge grid divide because it would cause huge costs for the system (DSOs and TSOs). 
The risk is related also by the fact that these cutting edge technologies require a system of monitoring 
sensors, and this will probably still certify the difference between the services rented to industries and 
consumers in different areas of different countries. 
To summarize, the sandboxing and the experimentation also for cutting edge technologies, with a severe 
impact assessment of economic cost for industry and social cost of the society, are absolutely important. 
 The current regulatory framework is sufficient to ensure the achievement of energy efficiency goals 
for the transmission and distribution electricity networks, as expected in accordance with the 
European Energy Efficiency Directive? 
It is ready and adequate at 75%. Regulators are not enemies but partners, and they are doing efforts to 
coordinate among themselves and with the regulatory authorities. They must coordinate with the evolution of 
the rest of Europe that is still not belonging to the EU but that is going to adopt the same regulatory 
framework in order to harmonize in an efficient way the interconnections at TSO level and, in the future at 
DSO level. Going back to the sandboxing, it is essential to cover the gap. A wide coordination of the regulatory 
efforts at EU level is necessary, also for DSOs that have to agree on the guidelines related to the evolution of 
regulations. 
 According to your opinion, the procurement of energy losses should be under the responsibility of 
network operators (as it currently happens in the majority of EU Member States) or of suppliers? 
It depends on the quality and accuracy of metering of the energy flows along the whole grid.  
There is a shared responsibility between TSOs and DSOs but the most of the accuracy comes from DSOs, 
even if there are countries where, due to the lack of smart meters, probably the suppliers and retailers ensure 
more accurate data. It has to be underlined, however, that grid losses have been reduced a lot during last 
years. 
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 In general, it could be more effective to set mandatory regulations or to define incentives for 
investments, in order to support network operators in reducing network losses? 
In the future, the orientation is to provide mandatory provisions. For the transition, most probably to 
incentivize the support is the better way. The transformers do not have a long life cycle and the worry of 
generated stranded costs is very strong in the financial planning of operators. It the mid/long term the more 
effective option will be the mandatory regulation, in order to manage in an efficient way the electric system 
at EU level, but in the next 10-15 years an incentivized basis for regulation must be adopted. 
 The analysis of current regulatory practices related to the losses in transmission or distribution 
networks shows that, currently, incentives in almost all Member States apply only to DSOs and that 3 
main mechanisms can be identified: 
Incentive-based regulatory models, where the cost of losses is part of the general revenue cap (losses are 
treated like any other cost component) 
Allowed rate of losses to include in tariffs capped to a maximum percentage value 
Mechanisms allowing the network operator to be rewarded (or penalised) if network losses are lower (or 
higher) than a predetermined reference value 
According to your opinion, which is the best one and why? 
It is a very specific question. In fact, also the profile of losses changes between DSOs and within a DSO 
network. For instance, thinking about Enedis, in France, it can be observed that they adopt at least 7-8 
different local profiles for the evolution and planning of their grid and produce 7-8 approaches to regulatory 
solutions in order to solve or monitor the losses that they generate. 
Different DSOs can have different attitude towards the three mechanisms, due to the fact that, in terms of 
losses, there are different behaviours of the networks among different countries, so it is reasonable to have 
different regulations in different countries. 
 According to your opinion, which could be the tariffs design that leads to the most positive impact on 
the reduction of network losses? 
It is very specific. The management of losses is one of the parameter of the performance of DSOs, it is an 
economic performance indicator and it is a market performance indicator. A system rewarding the strict 
management of the losses and the compensation of the reduction of losses on a percentage basis could be a 
fair solution. 
 The current regulation related to electricity and gas could allow an effective cross-vector integration 
among them, in a future perspective, in order to enhance the energy system flexibility? If no, which 
changes could be required? 
The sector coupling is a notion that is far beyond gas and it is a rationalization and an integration of systems 
related to the energy and data management that will require relevant investments. This question should be 
extremely split, because it refers to an integration among different networks based on a concessions system 
that is critical (from an organizational perspective) for the consumers. The fragmentation and structure of the 
different concessions between electricity and gas, the difficulty of combining the duration periods of 
concessions and the localization of these concessions lead a high difficulty in defining a coordinated approach 
for the development and modernization of these two distribution networks. 
There could be two approaches. One is the commercial one (mainly adopted by the small distributions), which 
starts from the status of the grids, implements modernization actions where they are requested, and 
produces value from the combination of the two sectors (electricity and gas) under the administrative point of 
view, reducing the costs for the individual customers. The second approach, which should be the correct one, 
stars instead from the comparison of the technological status of the two grid, checking if sufficient 
investments have been performed in order to have smart meters in both of the networks, thus ensuring 
accurate measurements, verifying if the citizens have been properly encouraged (independently from the 
retailers) to use condensing boilers (that could ensure an effective sector coupling, profitable also for final 
customers). Furthermore, it requires to verify if those measures have to be undertaken due to an obligation or 
to incentives provided by the regulation, and which is the role played by the competitors in the regulatory 
framework. 
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The Power-to-Gas, for instance, has several implications, ranging from the role of TSOs in the management of 
the High Voltage transmission (requested by the PtG process), to the introduction in the strategic choice (w.r.t. 
the more general framework of the need for electrification of final uses) of a variable that can modify the 
normal supply of electricity for its common uses (lighting and electrical mobility). A key question is: what 
could happen if the subjects that produce and transport electricity will see in the transformation of electricity 
into another energy commodity (namely, gas) a higher profit w.r.t. to the one generated by the use of 
electricity for the common purposes? Moreover, in the next future there will be investments dedicated to the 
PtG? Who will make these investments? The development of PtG will use the current electricity network? 
Finally, who will define the priorities? In the choice of priorities, the situation will be in fact very complex, 
involving not only the market dimension, but also the economic and the political ones. 
 From a technical point of view, which could be the best actions to be implemented for maximising 
the increase in electricity network efficiency keeping a balance between investments and economic 
savings deriving from losses reduction? 
The combination of electronic measurements and of a dynamic management of the storage. 
 Which good practices and recommendations the European Union should introduce in order to build a 
common framework for all the Member States? 
The solution is: a common reference framework, guidelines instead of strict regulatory obligations, a very 
basic strict regulation for tariffing standards and the possibility to experiment and open up cross border 
distribution at lover tension level (cross border interconnections at distribution and not only transmission 
level), and encouragements for DSOs to support local communities in interacting among themselves. 
This is only possible with digitalization, interactive platforms, smart metering, smart management of the grid, 
etc., but it is necessary to give the right for neighbouring communities to interact with the distribution system 
even if the distributors are different. 
The goal is an integration of the neighbouring resources, which could allow to active citizens to participate 
and to optimize the great capillarity of the electricity network. 
 
5.3 Charles Esser, Secretary General of CEER (Council of European Energy 
Regulators) 
 Which are the most promising actions you have in mind for the increase in the efficiency of 
electricity networks? Which is the role played by transmission and distribution respectively? 
It depends on the kind of scheme for incentives for TSOs and DSOs and on the tariffs structure. With respect 
to the technical aspects, the EU Directive setting technical criteria for the new transformers can be mentioned. 
 The current regulatory framework is sufficient to ensure the achievement of energy efficiency goals 
for the transmission and distribution electricity networks, as expected in accordance with the 
European Energy Efficiency Directive? 
There are different national views on this issue. It has been effective in the northern European countries. 
 According to your opinion, the procurement of energy losses should be under the responsibility of 
network operators (as it currently happens in the majority of EU Member States) or of suppliers? 
Considering as an example the Finnish case, in Finland the responsible are the DSOs, which have to tender for 
losses. There is a market mechanism to acquire the electricity needed for compensating losses: in this way it 
is possible to minimize the related cost, which is then charged back to final customers in the tariffs. 
 In general, it could be more effective to set mandatory regulations or to define incentives for 
investments, in order to support network operators in reducing network losses? 
It is possible to have at the same time some mandatory components and some incentives schemes. A 
combination of minimum technical standards and incentives is the best option. 
 The analysis of current regulatory practices related to the losses in transmission or distribution 
networks shows that, currently, incentives in almost all Member States apply only to DSOs and that 3 
main mechanisms can be identified: 
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Incentive-based regulatory models, where the cost of losses is part of the general revenue cap (losses are 
treated like any other cost component) 
o Allowed rate of losses to include in tariffs capped to a maximum percentage value 
o Mechanisms allowing the network operator to be rewarded (or penalised) if network losses are 
lower (or higher) than a predetermined reference value 
o According to your opinion, which is the best one and why? 
The first one is the best one. 
 According to your opinion, which could be the tariffs design that leads to the most positive impact on 
the reduction of network losses? 
It is a difficult to give a unique answer. In Finland, for example, losses do not play a relevant role in tariffs. 
Generally speaking, it should be avoided to have too much pressure on DSOs regarding this aspect, putting 
too much attention on losses in the tariff design. 
 The current regulation related to electricity and gas could allow an effective cross-vector integration 
among them, in a future perspective, in order to enhance the energy system flexibility? If no, which 
changes could be required? 
It is difficult to presently understand the possible evolution in terms of cross vector-integration, which could 
involve not only electricity and gas DSOs, but also those related to district heating and water distribution. 
 From a technical point of view, which could be the best actions to be implemented for maximising 
the increase in electricity network efficiency keeping a balance between investments and economic 
savings deriving from losses reduction? 
There are several differences among countries (in different areas there could be different return rates of the 
investments), so it is difficult to generalize. 
 Which good practices and recommendations the European Union should introduce in order to build a 
common framework for all the Member States? 
A common guideline should be set. 
5.4 The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER)  
 Which are the most promising actions you have in mind for the increase in the efficiency of 
electricity networks? Which is the role played by transmission and distribution respectively? 
Sweden - Ei 
- Transmission? Better coordination with DSOs, customers and TSOs in neighbouring countries. Better 
long planning process to meet future challenges in a cost-efficient way. Evaluating new kind of 
solutions such as DLR. The role compared to DSOs is to have the overall coordination, both national 
and with other countries. They also have the role to develop methods/policies (often together with 
ENTSO-E).  
- Distribution? Varies a lot between DSOs (Sweden has >170 DSOs with very different sizes etc.) Some 
DSOs could do much more, while other do a relatively good job today. Some are at a regional level 
close to the TSO (called sub-transmission in many countries), while others are very local with only LV 
and MV. They also have to be better on long term planning in a cost-efficient way, both for own 
investment planning and to give information for DSOs and the TSO at higher voltage level (so they 
can do the correct long-term planning). They should also consider working with developing tariff that 
better incentivize a more even load and that reflect actual costs. They should also evaluate new 
solutions when relevant. Some small DSOs has also potential working of reduce non-technical losses 
even if Sweden in overall has relatively good metering.   
The Netherlands - ACM 
We currently do not have an overview of concrete actions planned or executed by TSO and DSOs with 
regard the increase of energy efficiency of their networks as this is only implicitly incentivized through 
the tariff regulation on the reduction of total cost.   
Slovenia - AGEN 
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AGEN welcomes activities that are targeted into promoting the development of the network concept with 
minimal losses (e.g. underground cabling, incorporation of new technologies, introducing low-loss 
transformers, development and implementation of advanced metering systems, replacement of energy 
equipment, implementation of network configuration optimizations etc.). 
Belgium 
Federal (CREG- transmission): 
The transmission tariff methodology includes incentives toward efficiency, such as revenue cap on Opex, 
incentive on innovation activities, CBA on large infrastructure projects and an incentive to maximize the 
availability of existing interconnection capacities. The transmission network should enable the energy 
transition in the most efficient manner, offering reliable transportation capacities at minimum costs. 
 
Flanders (VREG-distribution): 
A good regulatory framework should incentivize the system operators to make deliberate investment 
decisions. 
Brussels (BRUGEL-distribution) 
The Brussels DSO is concerned to minimize its losses on the network but does not pursue a specific 
investment policy aimed solely at this objective. 
The DSO opts for the application of an opportunistic policy aimed, on the occasion of investments decided 
for other reasons, at seeking the most energy-efficient technical solutions. 
Among the planned investments are the following: 
 harmonization of the medium-voltage network towards an increase in the voltage of the 
5/6.6 kV networks to 11kV; 
 opportunistic development of the low voltage 230V network towards the 400V network; 
 the installation of high-performance MV/LV transformers; 
 Exploitation of LEDs and the use of dimming (for public lighting activities). 
 
 
 The current regulatory framework is sufficient to ensure the achievement of energy efficiency goals 
for the transmission and distribution electricity networks, as expected in accordance with the 
European Energy Efficiency Directive? 
Sweden - Ei 
- Yes, but what is expected for transmission and distribution? Both the TSO and the DSOs have 
economic incentives to reduce network losses, that can increase or decrease the regulated revenue 
cap. The TSOs and regional DSOs (sub-transmission) are benchmarked with their own historical levels 
to improve, while local DSOs are benchmarked with each other (adjust for that that they have 
different objective conditions: customer density and voltage levels). All DSOs has also an economic 
incentive to have a more even load profile using the load factor as an indicator (they are compared 
with their own history).  
The Netherlands - ACM 
In the Netherlands the TSO and DSOs are responsible for the procurement of energy losses. Also they are 
financially incentivised to reduce the total costs of ownership and operation (including energy losses) 
through our tariff regulation. Through this the network operators are incentivized to procure energy in an 
efficient manner and to take into account energy losses in the replacement of grid assets, as, for 
example, the energy losses increase with the lifetime of a transformer. For the new regulatory period, 
ACM considers increasing the financial incentives further. 
Slovenia - AGEN 
In the current regulatory framework (years 2019-2021), AGEN is implementing certain actions to achieve 
energy efficiency targets (such as incentives to reduce network losses), but there are (yet) no precise 
targets set to achieve costs efficiency and energy efficiency of electricity networks on larger scale. 
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Belgium 
Federal (CREG):  
We believe so. However, the new transmission tariff methodology is applied only since January 2020. A 
review of the provisions aiming at this goal, notably the above mentioned incentives, will be carried on from 
2022. 
Flanders (VREG) 
No, once there are potential measures identified, there is no further obligation or stimulus for improvement. 
Brussels (BRUGEL) 
The Brussels power network is an urban network and the power losses are estimated at approximately 3% 
(technical and non-technical losses). However, the current regulatory framework is considered not sufficient 
enough, because it is not binding. 
 
 According to your opinion, the procurement of energy losses should be under the responsibility of 
network operators (as it currently happens in the majority of EU Member States) or of suppliers? 
Sweden - Ei 
The network operators would be responsible.  
The Netherlands - ACM 
The procurement of energy losses should be under the responsibility of the network operators. 
Slovenia - AGEN 
AGEN believes that this task should be performed by the electricity network operators. 
 
Belgium 
Federal (CREG):  
We believe TSOs should be responsible for the procurement of energy losses as it allows a regulatory 
supervision and incentives toward efficiency. TSO procurement would improve transparency and non-
discriminatory socialization of the costs. The transmission tariff methodology foresees an incentive for the 
TSO to efficiently purchase the energy to cover the transmission losses.  
Currently, in Belgium, in application of the legislation, BRPs are responsible for the procurement of the energy 
to cover high voltage transmission losses. However, the legislation has recently (2019) been modified 
allowing this responsibility to be borne by the TSO, under proposal from the TSO and approval from the NRA 
(CREG). As to this date, such proposal has not yet been received by the CREG. 
Flanders (VREG) 
Network operators, so that they have an incentive for improvement of their assets.  
Brussels (BRUGEL) 
The procurement of electricity for covering the losses is done by the DSO via public tenders challenging the 
various offers from the suppliers. This system puts the responsibility on the DSO but the regulatory authority 
has the right to view the applied prices and can eventually refuse them if these are unreasonable 
 
 In general, it could be more effective to set mandatory regulations or to define incentives for 
investments, in order to support network operators in reducing network losses? 
Sweden - Ei 
o Ei is of the opinion that incentives are a better way to move forward. 
 
The Netherlands - ACM 
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ACM thinks that it is best to incentivise network efficiency on a total cost level, including the procurement 
of energy losses. 
Slovenia - AGEN 
In order to increase the energy efficiency of electricity networks, binding targets should be set at least at 
the transmission networks level, or on the EU single market respectively. However, the mechanism for 
achieving energy efficiency targets should be implemented through incentives for electricity network 
operators. 
AGEN believes that lower comparability between distribution systems may make it less efficient to 
achieve uniform energy efficiency targets at EU level. 
Belgium 
Federal (CREG):  
Incentives. NRA should define targets (efficiency gains) to be achieved by the TSO. Part of the efficiency 
gains should then be granted to the TSO as a reward. The regulator (NRA of public authorities) are not in 
a position to efficiently define mandatory target. The TSO should be incentivized to pursue the optimal 
volume of network losses striking an optimal balance between cost of losses and costs of investments to 
reduce losses. 
 
Flanders (VREG) 
Agree (potentially linked to incentive regulation). 
 
Brussels (BRUGEL) 
The actions could target investments (by recommending specific prescriptions and norms) and on a 
regulatory level via tariffs, but the driver for the DSO will probably remain the cost reduction. 
 
 The analysis of current regulatory practices related to the losses in transmission or distribution 
networks shows that, currently, incentives in almost all Member States apply only to DSOs and that 3 
main mechanisms can be identified: 
o Incentive-based regulatory models, where the cost of losses is part of the general revenue 
cap (losses are treated like any other cost component) 
o Allowed rate of losses to include in tariffs capped to a maximum percentage value 
o Mechanisms allowing the network operator to be rewarded (or penalised) if network losses 
are lower (or higher) than a predetermined reference value 
According to your opinion, which is the best one and why? 
 
Sweden - Ei 
o The third mechanism (reward/penalty) is used in the Swedish regulation. It may result in an 
increase or decrease (adjustment) of the annual regulatory return on the regulated asset 
base (RAB). 
 
The Netherlands - ACM 
Incentive-based regulatory models, as they incentivise grid operators to minimise the total costs. The grid 
operator is best placed to determine for example how/where energy losses in its grid can be reduced best 
and what the corresponding costs are (e.g. replacing a transformer). 
Slovenia - AGEN 
AGEN believes the best approach of the above is the 3rd option due to introduced penalty-reward scheme 
which in order to encourage network operators to achieve lower electricity network losses. 
Belgium 
Federal (CREG):  
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We believe, at transmission level, that volume of losses are barely in the hands of the TSO. Therefore, 
negligible it would be ineffective and unfair, hence inefficient, to impose ex-ante targets on volumes of 
losses. However, TSOs responsible for the procurement of energy to cover losses have an influence, 
although limited, on the price of this energy. Therefore, setting efficiency target in prices and granting 
part of the gains finally achieved to the TSO would our preferred option, as in the first mechanism above. 
This incentive could target the costs of losses (volume * price) in order to act also on volume, in the limits 
of the TSO’s impact. 
 
Flanders (VREG) 
Energy losses are already under the responsibility of the distribution network operators and thereby 
already included in the revenue cap. A maximum allowed rate of losses will not always lead to the most 
efficient investment. A reward or penalty mechanism seems the best way to stimulate network operators 
to implement energy efficiency measures. 
 
Brussels (BRUGEL) 
This is a complex question and the answer depends on the regulatory context and the level of network 
losses of the DSO’s. 
The cost of losses depends on the percentage of the losses (volume) and the cost of procurement for 
covering them. Taking into consideration only the percentage of the losses such as suggested in the 2nd 
point does not seem optimal. The first and the third point can coexist: treat losses like other costs and 
give incentives (bonus/malus) on Loss-related KPI’s. 
 
 
 According to your opinion, which could be the tariffs design that leads to the most positive impact on 
the reduction of network losses? 
Sweden - Ei 
The reward/penalty model.  
 
 
The Netherlands - ACM 
ACM thinks that on itself the way the allowed revenues are determined are more important than the 
tariff design. That being said, energy losses are generally higher when the actual capacity used on the 
grid is higher, as losses rise exponentially.  As such, a network tariff structure that incentivises grid users 
to avoid capacity peaks can contribute in reducing energy losses. 
Slovenia - AGEN 
AGEN believes that a volumetric tariff component (EUR / kWh) for the payment of the electricity network 
charge would be appropriate to represent clear price signal to the electricity network users to reduce 
network losses; this kind of tariff component should include also a time signal, when network losses are 
higher. 
Belgium 
Federal (CREG):  
A tariff design that leads to a reduction of network losses can only be efficient if the party that has to 
pay the tariff can have a noticeable impact on the grid losses. Most grid users do not have such an 
impact. 
That is why we think that a tariff design should also foresee incentives for the network operator to 
operate and develop the network at the most economical way taking losses into account. The tariff 
design should also foresee incentives for the network operator to compensate the non-avoidable losses 
at the lowest costs for the grid users. 
 
Flanders (VREG) 
Tariff design is not only focused on reducing network losses but total network cost in the first place. 
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Brussels (BRUGEL) 
This is not confirmed, but defining a tariff structure that provides an incentive for users not to use the 
network (or use it less) at times where it is overloaded could help to reduce losses as they are 
exponential at the level of the cables (P = R*I²). The use of multiple timeframes for distribution tariffs 
could be considered. 
 
 
 The current regulation related to electricity and gas could allow an effective cross-vector integration 
among them, in a future perspective, in order to enhance the energy system flexibility? If no, which 
changes could be required? 
Sweden - Ei 
- No, in Sweden the gas-sector has a very low part of the energy market (2-3%) and are limited to a 
minor geographical area. 
The Netherlands - ACM 
ACM has not yet determined what if current regulation would or would not allow an effective cross-sector 
integration but is willingly to exchange thought on this subject. 
Slovenia - AGEN 
Due to the lack of objectives, the current regulatory framework does not (yet) cover effective cross-
sectoral integration in terms of increasing energy flexibility. AGEN believes that in this direction, basic 
objectives and strategies in the EU area should be defined well. 
Belgium 
Flanders (VREG) 
Question unclear 
Brussels (BRUGEL) 
This is a topic on which no assessment or decision has been made yet because of the uncertainty of the 
future of the gas network. 
 
 
 From a technical point of view, which could be the best actions to be implemented for maximising 
the increase in electricity network efficiency keeping a balance between investments and economic 
savings deriving from losses reduction? 
Sweden - Ei 
o Procurement of flexibility, e.g. energy storage and more local production. 
 
The Netherlands - ACM 
Technical losses can generally be distinguished in (1) losses over the grid, depending mostly on actual 
capacity used on the grid and (2) losses over components, depending mostly on age and quality of those 
components. Considering the last, an advisable action for grid operators is to take into account what the 
energy losses of a component are in the decision when to replace it. Another point of attention is the 
voltage level in relation to capacity needed as higher voltage generally comes with lower losses per kWh 
transported. 
Slovenia - AGEN 
AGEN believes that a proper combination of actions on network operators’ side (e.g. investment to reduce 
network losses, various operational actions, etc.) and on network users’ side (e.g. real responsiveness to 
the tariff system, energy efficient, etc.) could gradually achieve increased energy efficiency of electricity 
networks. 
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Belgium 
Federal (CREG):  
A more efficient use of existing network infrastructure does generally lead to an increase of losses. 
Closely monitoring the temperature of conductors, for instance, will permit that the lines can be operated 
at a higher average load with an increase of useful capacity but also more losses as a consequence. Such 
an increase in capacity is usually economically justified despite the increase of losses. However, when 
designing new infrastructure, the network operator should be obliged to take also the losses into account. 
New infrastructure should be optimized not only for needed capacity but also by taking the economic 
value of the losses over the lifetime of the new infrastructure into account. 
 
 
 
 Which good practices and recommendations the European Union should introduce in order to build a 
common framework for all the Member States? 
Sweden - Ei 
- Transmission? 
- Distribution? 
Both DSOs and TSOs: Set goals and recommend economic incentive schemes, but it should be up to the 
Member States to set details that fit specific conditions of each Member State. 
The Netherlands - ACM 
ACM thinks that it is best to incentivise network efficiency on a total cost level, including the procurement 
of energy losses although specific requirements on loss levels for components used in the EU could also 
be a method for general loss reduction. 
Slovenia - AGEN 
Good practice 
An example of good practice is to effectively determine network losses with the establishment of the 
identification of real (actual) network losses; this is actually reflected with the increasing of the share of 
advanced measuring devices installed in the electricity networks. 
Recommendation 
To find common goals at EU level (primarily at the level of transmission networks in order to create 
equivalent conditions for the proper functioning of EU internal market) and to find incentive mechanisms 
to increase energy efficiency of electricity networks. It is also necessary to introduce the effective control. 
 
At national level, incentive mechanisms should be put in place to identify energy efficiency targets for 
electricity networks and consequently which should lead to the creation of common targets at EU level. 
Belgium 
Federal (CREG):  
The obligation to take the economic value of the losses over the lifetime of into account when designing 
new infrastructure. 
 
5.5 Jochen Kreusel, Vice President T&D Europe; Laure Dulière, Policy adviser 
T&D Europe  
 Which are the most promising actions you have in mind for the increase in the efficiency of 
electricity networks? Which is the role played by transmission and distribution respectively? 
It is necessary to distinguish between passive and active contributions. Active contributions are those related 
to the use of efficient components, especially transformers (for them there are already measures available, 
related to new installations). Transformers are relevant because they provide the major contribution to losses 
and, consequently, associated to them there is the highest possible efficiency gain. Secondly, constructing new 
lines or reconstructing lines, the load situation changes and the operation of the system has to be performed 
according to an optimization of the power flow, able to minimize losses. Therefore, there are two kind of 
interventions leading to impacts on losses: structural interventions, using efficient components (e.g. installing 
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new transforms) and operational interventions (e.g. optimal dispatch). The first is more easy to implement and 
to measure, the second (strongly depending on loads and grid structure) is instead more difficult to quantify.  
 The current regulatory framework is sufficient to ensure the achievement of energy efficiency goals 
for the transmission and distribution electricity networks, as expected in accordance with the 
European Energy Efficiency Directive? 
It is important to have economic mechanisms setting strong incentives, higher with respect to the current 
ones, that could be effective for new installations, choosing the more efficient components, but not in pushing 
the replacement of old inefficient components, like transformers (whose average age in Europe is equal to 
several decades). The advantage of Energy Efficiency Directive is that it makes visible that energy efficiency 
contributes to save energy, but to materialize these savings the EED has to be put in parallel with the market 
design. 
 According to your opinion, the procurement of energy losses should be under the responsibility of 
network operators (as it currently happens in the majority of EU Member States) or of suppliers? 
The network operator should be in charge of this, as it is the subject that can invest and take action to reduce 
network losses, but it should clearly see the costs and the benefits of doing this, and stronger incentives – as 
previously mentioned – are required. 
 In general, it could be more effective to set mandatory regulations or to define incentives for 
investments, in order to support network operators in reducing network losses? 
A special attention to efficiency has to be payed in regulation, which could be both a mandatory regulation 
setting minimum standards and a special treatment of cost of losses, eventually also allowing a certain 
amount of cost of losses being reinvested. An example of “stick and carrot” measures is represented by Spain, 
where the better performing operators get a bonus coming from the penalties applied to the less performing 
DSOs; this is a good way for promoting best practices for operators. 
 The analysis of current regulatory practices related to the losses in transmission or distribution 
networks shows that, currently, incentives in almost all Member States apply only to DSOs and that 3 
main mechanisms can be identified: 
o Incentive-based regulatory models, where the cost of losses is part of the general revenue 
cap (losses are treated like any other cost component) 
o Allowed rate of losses to include in tariffs capped to a maximum percentage value 
o Mechanisms allowing the network operator to be rewarded (or penalised) if network losses 
are lower (or higher) than a predetermined reference value 
 According to your opinion, which is the best one and why? 
The first one is weak and in the best case gives incentives to select more efficient components when they 
have to be replaced. Therefore, it can be considered when investments have to be done, but it results very 
weak. The second is a little bit stronger but setting a maximum does not provide incentives to take actions for 
doing more. The third one is the stronger one, giving an active signal to network operators and pushing them 
to enhance efficiency. 
 According to your opinion, which could be the tariffs design that leads to the most positive impact on 
the reduction of network losses? 
A tariff is a price payed by the user of the grid. Tariffs may be incentivised, but this is an efficiency outside 
the network, is not acting on the efficiency within the network. Of course, a volumetric tariff encourages to 
consume less, but this means reducing electricity consumption, without a direct effect on the network losses. 
Therefore, tariffs cannot impact on the efficiency of the grid itself, but are a price signal to the outside front. 
 The current regulation related to electricity and gas could allow an effective cross-vector integration 
among them, in a future perspective, in order to enhance the energy system flexibility? If no, which 
changes could be required? 
One aspect is that there is no aim of a consistent price structure between gas and electricity. In fact, for 
instance, over past years, in several EU Member States there were increases in electricity price due to energy 
transition and the increase of renewables in the power generation, which means distorting pricing disregard 
choosing between electricity and gas. This is not a supporting situation for electricity penetration. If we 
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assume that the role of electricity has to increase in order to support the energy transition, putting all the cost 
burden on the electricity side will be not appealing for users. It has however to be underlined that, according 
to the European Green Deal, the carbon impact of fuels is becoming more important, favouring electricity 
from RES. 
 From a technical point of view, which could be the best actions to be implemented for maximising 
the increase in electricity network efficiency keeping a balance between investments and economic 
savings deriving from losses reduction? 
From the technical point of view, every component has to be touched, but it is important to consider that we 
are in the energy transition, with a lot of changes that can lead to different efficiency impacts not related to 
the efficiency of the network itself and that involve a mix of regulation, technical system and market rules. 
 Which good practices and recommendations the European Union should introduce in order to build a 
common framework for all the Member States? 
It is important to link the two pillars related to energy efficiency: the Efficiency Directive and the market 
design guidelines, which are both influencing the contribution of network to energy efficiency. Furthermore, a 
“stick and carrot” system for network operators, rewarding good efficiency performances and penalizing 
losses, certainly could help in increasing the awareness of DSOs, which is not very high today. 
 
5.6 Francesco Careri, Policy Officer - Infrastructure and Adequacy at European 
Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) 
DISCLAIMER: The information and views described in this interview are those of the author and cannot be 
considered as an official communication or position of the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators. 
 
 Which are the most promising actions you have in mind for the increase in the efficiency of 
electricity networks ? Which is the role played by transmission and distribution respectively? 
The concept of energy efficiency proposed in this analysis focuses mostly on the physical losses of the 
grid. 
Regarding this aspect, as far as European transmission systems are concerned, losses are limited 
(accounting for about 2%), mostly technical and difficult to reduce. In other countries outside the EU, 
where very long transmission lines are present, the issue could be more relevant, there are technological 
measures – as example, AC to HVDC lines in several cases – that can be implemented to reduce losses. 
For distribution systems, the voltage control could help, as better voltage profiles could result in lower 
losses. 
Actions like possible interventions in terms of infrastructure assets (high efficiency transformers on the 
transmission/distribution network, superconductivity wiring, etc.) do not seem currently as a relevant 
option, at least in the short term. For instance, superconductivity is a solution still not commercially 
available. In the long term, if the transmission network system will be shaped as supergrids (electricity 
highways) with long lines connecting, for example, generation hubs in the North Sea and in the 
Scandinavian area or in Southern Europe (for solar power) with the load centres in Central Europe, these 
ideas could play a role. However, this is only one possible future evolution of the European power system 
in the very long-term. Another future could be an evolution towards a more decentralised system, with 
generation close to the load centres and the integration of a lot of distributed generation, or a 
combination of both. 
It is difficult to foresee what will happen. There could be a combination of different measures taking into 
consideration the commitments of the single Member States with their NECPs and trajectories that 
should be followed if the EU Climate Law, as proposed by the European Commission, will be approved.  
For high efficiency transformers, substantial improvements are expected to be limited, as transformers 
are already extremely efficient and significant enhancements in reducing iron losses or copper losses 
cannot be expected. Investments in transmission network should be performed carrying out a 
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis and reduction of losses is only one of the main benefits achievable. 
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 The current regulatory framework is sufficient to ensure the achievement of energy efficiency goals 
for the transmission and distribution electricity networks, as expected in accordance with the 
European Energy Efficiency Directive? 
Regarding the transmission system, particular changes of regulatory frameworks to increase efficiency 
are not expected, because – first of all – ensuring efficiency is not the main goal of the regulatory 
framework. The main goal is to ensure that the proper investments are carried out by transmission 
network operators in a cost-efficient way and that costs are remunerated in a proper way. As explained 
above, the benefit of reducing losses thanks to transmission network investments is only one component, 
and it is not by far the main one. 
 According to your opinion, the procurement of energy losses should be under the responsibility of 
network operators (as it currently happens in the majority of EU Member States) or of suppliers? 
The answerer decided to not reply to the question. 
 In general, it could be more effective to set mandatory regulations or to define incentives for 
investments, in order to support network operators in reducing network losses? 
The priority should be to develop a consistent regulatory framework, which is quite stable and thus allows 
network operators to perform investments. Moving towards regulatory practices that take into 
consideration the full economic life cycle of the asset (TOTEX approach) could contribute in reducing 
losses because the latter are part of the OPEX. 
 The analysis of current regulatory practices related to the losses in transmission or distribution 
networks shows that, currently, incentives in almost all Member States apply only to DSOs and that 3 
main mechanisms can be identified: 
o Incentive-based regulatory models, where the cost of losses is part of the general revenue cap 
(losses are treated like any other cost component) 
o Allowed rate of losses to include in tariffs capped to a maximum percentage value 
o Mechanisms allowing the network operator to be rewarded (or penalised) if network losses are lower 
(or higher) than a predetermined reference value 
According to your opinion, which is the best one and why? 
The answerer decided to not reply to the question. 
 According to your opinion, which could be the tariffs design that leads to the most positive impact on 
the reduction of network losses? 
The answerer decided to not reply to the question. 
 The current regulation related to electricity and gas could allow an effective cross-sector integration 
among them, in a future perspective, in order to enhance the energy system flexibility? If no, which 
changes could be required? 
For what concerns transmission, which is the main focus speaking about cross-sectoral integration, 
evidence shows that integration is not enough. However, it has to be underlined that a review of the TEN-
E Regulation is going to be performed this year; so the current framework is expected to change soon. In 
particular, ACER is in the process of providing to the European Commission elements on how the TEN-E 
Regulation may be improved to allow cross-sectorial collaboration.  
 From a technical point of view, which could be the best actions to be implemented for maximising 
the increase in electricity network efficiency keeping a balance between investments and economic 
savings deriving from losses reduction? 
As said before, in many cases the economic savings deriving from loss reduction in transmission systems 
are negligible. Moreover, a better usage of the transmission asset, which is a sort of efficiency, may 
result in several cases with an increase of losses (e.g. higher flows on a transmission line). Performing a 
cost-benefit analysis just focusing on reducing losses and on the improvements given by losses reduction, 
could result in a not viable project in many cases, at least in transmission system. It is important to 
consider the economic savings deriving from all the different benefit indicators (increase in security of 
supply, increase of social welfare, etc.). In fact, comparing different options, the same benefit could be 
achieved in different ways: for instance, by building new power lines or by investing, as example, in 
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Dynamic Line Rating. In this last case, the benefit on losses could be negative, because with a Dynamic 
Line Rating it is possible to have higher losses. As said before, considering the whole set of benefits that 
investments in transmission network may bring, it can be observed that losses are just one component, 
and not the most important one in several cases. 
 Which good practices and recommendations the European Union should introduce in order to build a 
common framework for all the Member States? 
For what concern infrastructure regulation, output-based approaches linked with benchmarking of current 
efficiency (defining proper metrics in terms of efficiency of network operation) are a possible good option. 
The aspect is however not only at the European level but also and especially at the national level: the 
results of such EU good practices and recommendations are therefore linked to the level of reception and 
implementation at national level. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
30 
6 ELECTRICITY AND GAS INTERACTIONS 
 
The interrelations between electricity and gas are becoming more and more important and it is expected to be 
crucial in the next decades 
 From one side, these two commodities can be seen as competitor in the framework of the so-called 
energy transition towards decarbonisation of energy and economic systems: in this context, the high 
ratio between the electricity price and the gas price is considered one of the most relevant barriers to 
the electrification of the energy final uses [22] 
 From the other side, these commodities can instead be integrated: in fact, the so-called supply-side 
sector-coupling (or “cross-vector integration”) among them is considered one of the strategies that 
can relevantly enhance the flexibility of energy systems and allow the achievement of 
decarbonisation goals in a more cost-effective way, reducing the total costs related to the energy 
transition 
A possible link between the electricity and gas sectors is represented by the implementation of the Power-to-
Gas (PtG) technologies, which can be used to produce synthetic methane or hydrogen using electricity (from 
renewables, in a decarbonisation perspective), when it is available at low prices. The generated gas can be 
stored in the short term by means of the gas infrastructure (linepack) and, if necessary, reconverted into 
electricity (Gas-to-Power). The use of PtG when there is an excess in electricity supply eliminates the need for 
curtailment of renewable electricity generation or the need for additional investments in electricity 
transmission, distribution or storage infrastructure. This cross-vector integration can also be helpful in 
effectively addressing seasonal fluctuations in energy demand. In fact, in widely electrified energy systems 
like those that can be forecasted according to the energy transition, a sufficient electricity supply should be 
ensured to fulfil the additional demand for heating during cold periods. This will require relevant storage or 
additional electricity generation capacities, and the existing gas storage capacity can be exploited for this aim. 
The stored gas can be then reconverted into electricity. However, it has to be underlined that the overall 
conversion process leads to quite low efficiency values [24], [25]. For instance, the conversion chain from 
power to power (production of hydrogen from electricity through electrolysis, hydrogen storage, electricity 
generation from hydrogen through fuel cells) is characterised by an energy efficiency lower than 40%. If 
hydrogen is produced for blending into natural gas pipelines and then used for producing electricity by means 
of gas turbines, the efficiency further reduces to values lower than 25%. Furthermore, according to Bompard 
et al. [26], also the long-distance transportation of energy as electricity through HVDC is more convenient that 
the transport through gas pipelines: the use of HVDC ensures at the consumption point more than 98% of 
primary energy, while the adoption of the power-to-gas technology and the consequent use of gas pipelines 
reduces this value to 44%. Moreover, if the gas is converted again into electricity this chain allows to exploit 
only 25.5% of the primary energy source. Eventually, even if PtG could be a significant option in order to 
enhance flexibility in future energy systems, it will be economically sustainable only if it can be operated with 
a high load factor, and not only to exploit the electricity supply excess, due to the high technological 
investment costs. 
According to a study commissioned by the European Parliament's Committee on Industry, Research and 
Energy [23], the cross-vector integration between electricity and gas, however, has to overcome several 
barriers in the short and mid-term. These barriers can be both 
 technical-economic: 
related to the technologies (materials, costs and performances), to the availability of resources and 
infrastructures and to the market conditions 
 policy and regulatory: 
related to the planning and operation of integrated energy systems, to the climate and energy policies and to 
the market design (including network tariffs). 
Focusing on policy and regulation, one of the key aspects is represented by the lack of integrated planning 
and operation practices, which should cover the entire energy chain (from supply to demand), all the energy 
commodities and all the scales (from local to European). Integrated planning and operation of energy 
infrastructure, in particular, should consider the interrelationships between the electricity, gas and heat 
sectors, in order to assure that new investments are reasonable even in a long-term perspective 
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Climate and energy policies, which are the first driver of electrification in Europe, as highlighted by Eurelectric 
[27], are another crucial element. Energy policies should be consistent and provide suitable incentives for the 
development of flexible decarbonised energy systems. One of the key aspect is, in fact, represented by 
efficient GHG emissions reduction policies and carbon pricing mechanisms, that could be implemented as 
reform of the EU emission trading scheme (ETS) or as carbon tax. The EU ETS currently covers only power 
generation and industry sector, while the building, transport and agriculture sectors are not included, even if 
some Member States have introduced carbon pricing for non-ETS sectors; this underlines the need for a more 
coordinated approach, based on a similar CO2 taxation for all energy commodities and sectors 
The market design is another crucial barrier. In particular several studies [28],[29] underline the need for 
modify the present regulation related to gas transmission, distribution and storage, adapting revenue 
regulation (capital cost, asset valuation, depreciation, project-specific rules), taking into consideration the role 
of network operators in storage, and enhancing incentives for innovation 
Furthermore, the Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E; aiming at ensuring a better interconnection of 
electricity and gas infrastructures across national borders) and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF; a funding 
instrument aiming at promoting the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently 
interconnected trans-European networks) mechanisms could be reformed, according to the new European 
investment priorities, such as infrastructure investments to facilitate the deployment of renewable gas and 
electricity, which would enable sector coupling 
The structure of tariffs for grid connection and access has been identified as another element that can act as 
enabler or barrier for the coupling between electricity and gas. Depending on the tariff methodology, grid 
tariffs for energy storage or local injection of renewable electricity or gas can facilitate or penalise it: in 
particular, tariffs should be cost-reflective and technology-neutral, and should take into account the effects 
on grid operations arising from the injection of gas or electricity from local producers or storage facilities. For 
instance, considering the grid tariff schemes for storage, it can be observed that if storage operators have to 
pay grid charges for both the injection an withdrawal phases, storage becomes less competitive compared to 
other flexibility options. While the network code on harmonised transmission tariff for gas [30] sets measures 
to address the double charging issue, there are not similar measures for electricity 
Moreover, energy prices are not currently integrating all external costs, and consequently do not incentivise 
the most effective energy use and investment choices. Electricity prices are still regulated in several Member 
States, and do not reflect wholesale prices. Energy retail prices should not be fixed by authorities but should 
rather reflect wholesale prices, and surcharges or subsidies may not alter the competition among energy 
commodities and should address positive or negative externalities and policy targets. In this sense, the above 
mentioned implementation of proper carbon pricing could represent a way for making energy prices more 
cost-reflective and to reduce market and competition alterations [23] 
Appropriate rules and liquid markets with adequate time granularity should be set for reserve capacity and 
balancing energy (possibly at supra-national level) for ensuring the same conditions for various flexibility 
solutions to participate in these market segments [23]. 
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7 DISCUSSION  
 
7.1 Regarding network tariffs: 
Distribution tariffs are the charges levied mostly by DSOs to distribution grid users to compensate their costs. 
National remuneration mechanisms define the total income of DSOs from these tariffs. Setting or approving 
distribution grid tariffs is done by National regulatory authorities (NRAs) 
Historically, tariffs were applied to consumers according to the consumed volume (volumetric charges) to 
reflect the user's imposed costs to the grid. However, the introduction of prosumers made this tariff 
regulation more complicated, as the consumers' costs imposed on the grid are less linked to the consumed 
volume. For instance, the users which have distributed generators such as PV panels and are close to self-
sufficiency in terms of average consumed volume from the grid, are not necessarily imposing low cost on the 
grid, as long as they stay connected to the grid. The main deficiencies of this tariff structure are: 1) to lead to 
discrimination as users are not paying the cost they inflict on the grid but socialize them with other users, and 
2) not providing economic signals to consumers reflecting their costs to the network, which does not lead 
users to behave in an efficient manner [15]  
Several countries are using time of use distribution tariffs for non-domestic consumers with daily (night/day) 
or seasonal structure; 
Regarding the design of future EU-wide tariffs, all the EU stockholders agreed that the future tariffs design 
should ensure cost-efficiency and a fair distribution of network costs, including losses, among grid users; 
According to the EU guidelines, the goals for designing grid tariffs are: cost reflective, transparent and 
understandable, economically efficient (incentivizing behavior that maximizes social welfare), economically 
sustainable (covering infrastructure costs), non-discriminatory, and stable; 
In general, tariff structure can have 3 elements:  
 volume element (euro/kWh),  
 capacity element (euro/kW),   
 time element.  
Volume element is simple and promotes energy efficiency but does not reflect the drivers of distribution 
costs. Capacity element has the potential to fully cover the DSOs costs but provides less incentive for energy 
efficiency for consumers. Finally, time element encourages demand response but is more complex to 
implement [15] 
In [17], most common components of electricity distribution tariffs are presented as:  
 Fixed component (also known as standing/service charges by connection point),  
 Capacity component (to charge users for the availability of network infrastructures to use a 
maximum power),  
 Active Energy components (volumetric component, also known as variable/commodity charge which 
charges based on the actual energy usage),  
 Reactive energy/power component,  
 Loss energy component.  
In most countries losses are included in the active energy component. 
According to the energy efficiency directive, distribution network tariffs should not prevent:  load shifting from 
peak to off-peak hours by customers, energy savings from demand response of DGs or aggregators, demand 
reduction from energy efficiency measures undertaken by energy service providers, connection of DG at low 
voltages, connection of DGs closer to the consumption, and the storage of energy. 
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7.2 Regarding DSOs’ remuneration schemes: 
Traditionally, the bottlenecks of the distribution networks are alleviated by the DSOs through expanding the 
grid, which is not the most efficient option. As a more cost-efficient option, it has been suggested to harness 
flexibility from grid users (prosumers or regular generators). However, the remuneration scheme of DSOs is 
typically incentivizing the traditional grid expansion over the more efficient flexibility service provision option 
[15]; 
Traditional nature of DSO remuneration schemes were designed based on providing incentives for grid 
investment (CAPEX). However, going forward, a larger share of costs related to the distribution networks will 
be outside this regulated cost base. So, the DSOs would not be able to cover their expenses on such efficient 
activities, while having more incentives to take traditional less efficient solutions of expanding network 
capacities; 
Currently regulators provide several methods for treating losses in transmission and distribution networks: 
1) Incentive-based regulatory models where losses are treated like any other cost components and their 
cost is part of the general revenue cap,  
2) allowed rate of losses in the tariffs where a maximum rate of losses which can be covered by 
network tariffs is determined, and  
3) reward/penalty mechanisms allowing network operators to gain/loose profit if their network losses is 
higher/lower than a predetermined threshold [4] 
 
7.3 Regarding the Energy Efficiency Directive: 
“This Directive establishes a common framework of measures for the promotion of energy efficiency within 
the Union in order to ensure the achievement of the Union’s 2020 20% headline target on energy efficiency” 
Member states shall ensure that concrete measures and investments are identified for introduction of cost-
effective energy efficiency improvement action on network infrastructures; (Implementing the Energy 
Efficiency Directive – Commission Guidance COM(2013) 762 final – 3.7 Guidance on Article 15); 
Member states are asked to remove those incentives in transmission/distribution network tariffs that are 
adverse for the overall energy efficiency, including those that might prevent the participation of demand 
response in ancillary services market; (EED, 2012/27/EU – Art. 15.4); 
Member states should ensure that network operators are incentivized to improve energy efficiency in the 
design and operation of their infrastructures; (EED, 2012/27/EU – Art. 15.4); 
The energy efficiency directive has special focus on enhancing the application of high-efficiency cogeneration 
and district heating and cooling systems in the union. The member states should carry out comprehensive 
assessment on the potential for these technologies (EED, 2012/27/EU – Art. 14.1).. These assessments should 
provide information to the investors and contribute in a stable and supportive investment environment; 
Moreover, access to the grid and dispatch of electricity from high-efficiency cogeneration should be prioritised 
(EED, 2012/27/EU – Art. 15.5); 
Due to the important role of demand response programs on energy efficiency [31], member states should 
ensure that national energy regulatory authorities are able to assure that network tariffs and regulations 
incentivize energy efficiency improvement and support dynamic pricing for demand response measure (EED, 
2012/27/EU – Recital 45; Art. 15.1).   
.   
 
34 
8 RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The current evolving paradigm, driven by the energy transition towards decarbonisation of energy and 
economic systems, causes the need for an evolution of the regulatory framework, that is expected to become 
more complex and articulated, also taking into account the leading role that could be played by distributed 
generation from RES. In this sense, supporting actions for the implementation of more flexible local RES-
based energy systems (smart/micro-grids), able to exploit locally available resources, could be promoted, for 
instance through cost-reflective tariffs for prosumers and incentives for the aggregation into energy 
communities. This is coherent with what included in the Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the promotion of the use 
of energy from renewable sources, which states that “the move towards decentralised energy production has 
many benefits, including the utilisation of local energy sources, increased local security of energy supply, 
shorter transport distances and reduced energy transmission losses. Such decentralisation also fosters 
community development and cohesion by providing income sources and creating jobs locally” (recital 65), and 
that “small-scale installations can be of great benefit to increase public acceptance and to ensure the rollout 
of renewable energy projects, in particular at local level. In order to ensure participation of such small-scale 
installations, specific conditions, including feed-in tariffs, might therefore still be necessary to ensure a 
positive cost-benefit ratio, in accordance with Union law relating to the electricity market” (recital 17) [32]. 
These supporting action should also focus on incentivise the digitalisation, which is a key pillar for ensuring 
penetration and operation of local-scale smart systems, in order to ensure the needed integration of ICT 
solutions and the investments devoted to prevent and counteract possible critical issues, like those related to 
cyber security. Regarding this last aspect, the Directive (EU) 2019/944 on common rules for the internal 
market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU underlines that “the security of the smart metering 
systems and data communication shall comply with relevant Union security rules, having due regard of the 
best available techniques for ensuring the highest level of cybersecurity protection while bearing in mind the 
costs and the principle of proportionality” (Art. 20(b)) [33]. 
In this context, also the normative approaches to support the increase in energy efficiency of electricity 
network has to adapt to be really effective. In this sense, the Directive (EU) 2019/944 highlights that the 
“regulatory authorities should ensure that transmission system operators and distribution system operators 
take appropriate measures to make their network more resilient and flexible. To that end, they should monitor 
those operators’ performance based on indicators such as the capability of transmission system operators 
and distribution system operators to operate lines under dynamic line rating, the development of remote 
monitoring and real-time control of substations, the reduction of grid losses and the frequency and duration 
of power interruptions” (recital 83). 
Different approaches could be implemented, and – even if it is important to ensure an harmonization at EU 
level, also considering the expected evolution towards more integrated systems, not only at transmission level 
but also at distribution level – it is necessary to take into consideration that the different situations that 
currently characterise the single countries require ad hoc solutions, customized on their peculiarities, more 
than a general unique regulatory framework to be applied in all the EU Member States. In synthesis, the EU 
should provide reference guidelines more than strict regulations. 
First of all, a revised Energy Efficiency Directive, the regulation could include both mandatory elements and 
incentives. Some mandatory technical requirements for the grid, like the substitution of existing transformers 
at the end of their technical life with high efficiency ones, are surely necessary in order to intrinsically reduce 
the energy losses in the network. The mandatory requirement can be enforced with reference to the 
enforcement of technical standard on both components (e.g. high performance transformers) and design 
procedures (e.g. minimum total cost of wiring including cost of losses). However, the best option for enhancing 
energy efficiency is probably to set incentives, especially to DSOs for pushing the implementation of 
efficiency improvements; conversely, disincentives for non-efficient network could also be introduced, in order 
to further encourage DSOs to act. 
DSOs should remain the key actors in charge of the procurement of network losses, as they are the only 
entities able to operate on the efficiency of the grid in a proper way, with respect to both technical and non-
technical losses. 
Among the different possible approaches to incentive-based regulation, the inclusion of the cost of losses as 
a part of the revenue cap, treating losses as any other cost component and considering them as a controllable 
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cost, seems more effective in inducing DSOs to make the effort – in a transparent and verifiable way – for 
increasing the net efficiency. 
Of course, the costs of distribution losses should be defined and set taking into account the current status (in 
terms of type of prevalent losses, level of losses and historical trend), i.e. on the basis of DSOs’ past 
performances with individually established incentive goals. 
When the target level of losses is achieved, the incentives for decreasing losses should be concluded and any 
further action aiming at their reduction should be based on cost-benefit analyses and overall cost 
effectiveness of the considered measures. 
Even if this mechanism could be, in general, identified as the most promising one in pursuing the efficiency 
goal, according to the previously underlined need for a tailored regulatory approach at single country level, 
other mechanisms – like the introduction of rewards/penalization for DSOs depending on the amount of 
losses with respect to a given reference value or the introduction of a maximum percentage of allowed losses 
to be included in tariffs – can be set. 
From the technological point of view, the experimentation of cutting-edge technologies – able to support the 
efficiency enhancement of the grid – has to be supported and promoted, also through the introduction of 
regulatory sandboxes. After the experimentation phase, however, a coordination of the possible 
implementation of these cutting-edge technologies at European scale will be necessary, in order to avoid the 
development of a grid divide, leading to the coexistence, in the EU, of two types of networks: a high-
performance innovative grid and a low-efficiency traditional grid. 
The optimal development of the grid should be considered as a key aspect also in the framework of the 
possible integration between gas and electricity, and specific cost-benefit scenario analysis has to be 
preventively performed in order to explore the feasibility of new technological solutions like the Power-to-Gas 
one. 
Regarding the current Energy Efficiency Directive, amendments can be implemented, with a special reference 
to Art. 15, specifically focused on the energy efficiency of the transmission and distribution networks. 
In particular, Art. 15.2, requiring Member States to ensure the assessment of the energy efficiency potential 
of gas and electricity infrastructures and to introduce cost-effective efficiency improvements in the network, 
could be revised, stressing more the need for promoting a cross sectorial-integration among the two 
commodities (and the related infrastructures). In fact, even if this aspect is not directly related to the 
efficiency of the single infrastructures themselves, the possibility of ensuring – through integration – a higher 
flexibility of the system, coherently with the decarbonisation goals, is a way for efficiently using the existing 
networks. 
The removal of Art. 15.3 (related to the possibility of permitting components of schemes and tariff structures 
with a social aim for net-bound energy transmission and distribution), Art. 15.7 (related to the possibility for 
producers of electricity from high-efficiency cogeneration to issue calls for tender for the work of connection 
to the grid) and Art. 15.9 (related to the information regarding energy efficiency levels of installations 
undertaking fuel combustion with a rated thermal input equal to or higher than 50 MW) can be evaluated, as 
they are less relevant with respect to the overall aim of Article 15; Art. 15.7 could be incorporated in Art. 15.6 
(focused on high-efficiency cogeneration). 
Moreover, future revisions of the Energy Efficiency Directive should take into consideration (even by 
introducing ad hoc articles), in the framework of an evolution towards an increasing role of smart, 
decentralised and digitalised solutions, the effects that the introduction of innovative options like blockchain 
technology could determine on the development of the energy systems (including distribution infrastructures) 
and on their operation and overall efficiency. 
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